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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of the labor market matching process in terms of
incentive-based, two-sided search among heterogeneous agents. The matching process
is decomposed into its two component stages: the contact stage, in which job searchers
make contact with employers and the selection stage, in which they decide whether
to match. We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through
microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous
variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are
described through ￿rms￿job o⁄er and ￿ring decisions and workers￿job acceptance and
quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the U.S. can account for important empirical
regularities, such as the large volatilities of labor market variables, that the conventional
matching model cannot.
Keywords: Matching, incentives, adjustment costs, unemployment, employment,
quits, ￿ring, job o⁄ers, job acceptance.
JEL classi￿cation: E24, E32, J63, J64
1 Introduction
The mainstream literature on labor market search views the number of unemployed job
searchers and vacancies as inputs into a matching process, whose outcome is the number of
￿We would like to thank participants at the Euro Area Business Cycle Network conference in Amsterdam,
the EES conference "Macroeconomic ￿ uctuations and the Labor Market" (CREI, Barcelona), the NBER
Summer Institute 2009, the seminars at the UniversitØ Catholique Louvain-la-Neuve, Kiel IfW and the Insti-
tute for International Economic Studies (Stockholm) for comments. We are indebted to Dale Mortensen and
Pieter Gautier for discussing previous versions of this paper and to Larry Christiano, Wolfgang Lechthaler,
Chris Reicher and Thijs van Rens for very thorough comments.
1hired workers. The matching function, meant as a summary description of this matching
process, is assumed to be stable (e.g. Pissarides, 2000). This paper takes a fresh look at
the matching process by analyzing it explicitly in terms of its two component stages: (i)
the contact stage, in which job searchers make contact with employers who have vacancies
and (ii) the selection stage, in which both potential employers and job searchers gain some
information about one another and decide whether to match. We will show that while some
contributions to the search literature do acknowledge these two stages as separate decision
making processes, the full implications of this distinction for labor market dynamics have
thus far not been worked out. We address this issue by constructing a theoretical model
of two-sided selection among heterogeneous ￿rms and workers, calibrating this model for
the U.S. economy, and showing that it can account for empirical regularities (such as the
Shimer puzzle, i.e., the inability of the standard matching model to generate su¢ ciently large
volatilities of the job-￿nding rate and the unemployment) that have eluded the conventional
matching models.
The contact and selection stages are distinct in practice. In the contact stage, the job
searchers and potential employers have relatively little information about one another,1 so
that workers and vacancies each appear relatively homogeneous (as assumed in conventional
matching functions). At this stage, workers and ￿rms are engaged in a process of "out-
reach," i.e. reaching out to people who were hitherto unknown. In the selection stage,
the two parties exchange enough information about one another to permit them to decide
whether to consumate the match. On the basis of this additional information, workers and
vacancies appear as more heterogenous. At this stage, workers and ￿rms are in the process
of assessing the "match suitability." The labor market frictions relevant to the contact stage
are search costs; the frictions relevant to the selection stage are hiring costs for the ￿rm and
job acceptance costs for the worker.2 The outcome of the contact stage is an interview; the
outcome of the selection stage is a hire or a rejection. A job searcher who makes contact
with a potential employer becomes an applicant; an applicant who is selected becomes an
entrant to the ￿rm￿ s workforce.
The search literature thus far has either ignored the distinction between contact and
selection, or distinguished between them only in a very rudimentary way. Speci￿cally, the
matching function has been interpreted in two ways. In the ￿rst, traditional interpretation
(e.g. Pissarides, 2000, chapter 1), the matching function describes the outcome of both
1The information is limited to what can be gleaned from the vacancy ads, CVs, and other information
available before the job interview.
2For analytical simplicity and calibration tractability, the latter costs are not considered in the model
below.
2contact and selection, explaining how a given job searchers and vacancies lead to new hires.3
We call this the "encompassing matching function," since it encompasses both the contact
and selection stages.
In the second interpretation, the matching function covers only the contact stage, and
thus we call it the "contact function."4 A recent generation of matching models, where
workers and ￿rms are ￿rst matched through a contact function and then decide whether
to continue or to sever the contact in response to productivity perturbations, can be inter-
preted in this vein.5 In these "productivity perturbation models," however, the distinction
between contact and selection is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, when these models
are calibrated, the calibration relates unemployment to new hires, not to contacts (such as
interviews).6 Second, these models invariably assume that the proportion of interviews that
do not lead to hiring is equal to the proportion of currently employed workers who separate
from their jobs. But in practice interviews fail far more frequently than existing employ-
ment relationships, and the job ￿nding rate is much smaller than the retention rate.7 This
indicates that we need to distinguish between the breaking of contacts and the breaking of
selection (i.e. deselection of employees).
Our analysis addresses these di¢ culties and has the following features. First, it distin-
guishes sharply between contact and selection. The contact process is described by a contact
function, whereas the selection process is the outcome of two-sided search among heteroge-
neous agents. Second, selection is modeled analogously to deselection, i.e. the breaking of
existing employment relationships. Since the selection and deselection of employees in our
analysis is derived from incentives facing ￿rms and workers, we call our approach an "in-
centive theory of matching." Third, the match-speci￿c shocks that give rise to selection and
deselection are not just productivity perturbations, but shocks to both ￿rms￿pro￿tability
3Pissarides (2000, p. 3-4) claims that the matching function summarizes ￿heterogeneities, frictions and
information imperfections￿and represents ￿the implications of the costly trading process without the need
to make the heterogeneities and the other features that give rise to it explicit.￿This accords with many
other explanations of the matching function, such as that of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 390): "The
attraction of the matching function is that it enables the modeling of frictions in otherwise conventional mod-
els, with a minimum of added complexity. Frictions derive from information imperfections about potential
trading partners, heterogeneities..."
4Models that o⁄er microfoundations of the matching process fall into this category, since they investigate
the probability that randomly searching, homogeneous workers and homogeneous ￿rms (or, more generally,
buyers and sellers) ￿nd one another (Burdett, Shi and Wright, 2001, Montgomery, 1991, and others). In the
contact stage, after all, the speci￿c characteristics of the matched partners are not known and thus these
partners can be considered homogeneous.
5See, for example, the models of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
6Calibrating with respect to contacts would require vast new data sets on formal and informal meetings
between searching workers and searching employers and these data sets are not currently available.
7In the U.S., the average monthly job-￿nding rate is 0.45) and the average retention rate is around 0.97,
see e.g. Shimer (2005).
3and workers￿disutility of work. Thus the matching rate in our model is not the same as the
job o⁄er rate (as in conventional search models), but depends on both the ￿rms￿job o⁄er
rate and the workers￿job acceptance rate. Fourth, the making and breaking of matches in
our model are in￿ uenced by hiring and ￿ring costs.8 These costs drive a wedge between the
job-￿nding and the retention rate, so that the proportion of contacts that lead to new hires
is less than the proportion of incumbent workers that are retained.
In the context of a simple incentive model, we show that the encompassing matching
function is unable to replicate the behavior of our incentive theory. Next, we calibrate
an extended incentive model for the U.S. economy and show that it can account for some
important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot. First, our
model generates labor market volatilities that are close to what can be found in the empirical
data, speci￿cally for the unemployment rate, the job ￿nding rate and the separation rate.
This is remarkable, as we do not rely on any form of real wage rigidity. The standard
calibration of the conventional matching model9 (with exogenous or endogenous separations)
is unable to generate these high volatilities of labor market variables (see Shimer, 2005).
Second, our model can account for a negative correlation between job creation and job
destruction. And third, our model generates a strong negative correlation between vacancies
and unemployment (i.e., the Beveridge curve correlation). The standard calibrations of the
matching model, with endogenous job destruction (see Krause and Lubik, 2007), cannot
account for these last two stylized facts.10
Intuitively, the reason our model is more successful than the conventional matching model
at replicating the stylized facts above is that macroeconomic shocks are propagated di⁄er-
ently. In the conventional matching models, the employment e⁄ect of a change in aggregate
productivity depends on the change in new hires generated by the matching function, and
this matching function exhibits diminishing returns (i.e. a declining marginal product of
matches with respect to unemployment and vacancies). In our incentive model, the adjust-
ments are made on a di⁄erent margin. Since the agents in our model face heterogeneous
8The hiring costs are not to be confused with vacancy posting costs, since the vacancy posting costs are
incurred before the contact is made, whereas the hiring costs are incurred after the contact.
9The ￿standard￿calibration of the model excludes rigid wages and small surplus calibrations. Although
the rigid wage version of the search and matching model can also generate higher volatilities (Hall, 2005), it
implies that counterfactual prediction that wages are acyclical. Thus we do not make this assumption here.
We also do not rely on Hagedorn and Manvoskii￿ s (2008) small surplus calibration, in which the average
unemployed worker is basically indi⁄erent between working and not working. In the calibrated version of our
model, the current period￿ s utility of an average unemployed is only about 60% of the utility of an employed.
10The search and matching model with exogenous job destruction actually has a strong negative correlation
between the job ￿nding rate and the unemployment (see Shimer, 2005). However, there is an intensive
debate in the literature whether separations are exogenous or not (see, for example, Hall, 2006, and Fujita
and Ramey, 2009, for opposing views). Separations are endogenous in our analysis.
4match-speci￿c shocks, a change in aggregate productivity a⁄ects the range of match-speci￿c
shocks over which ￿rms are willing to make job o⁄ers and workers are willing to accept these
o⁄ers. Since aggregate productive shocks are autocorrelated, they can have a substantial
leverage e⁄ect on the expected present value of pro￿t generated by newly hired workers and
incumbent workers, and thereby a strong e⁄ect on the hiring and separation thresholds. In
short, whereas an aggregate productivity shock a⁄ects employment via the matching function
in the conventional matching models, it a⁄ects employment via the mass of the distribution
of match-speci￿c shocks at which job-o⁄er decisions and job-acceptance decisions are made.
This explains why our incentive model is more successful than the conventional matching
model in generating the observed high volatilities of the unemployment rate, the job ￿nding
rate. The other stylized facts can be understood intuitively along the same lines.
Finally, we take a ￿rst step towards examining the relative importance of the contact and
selection stages of matching in accounting for the stylized facts above. We show that the
greater the role played by a conventional contact function in determining matches, the less the
calibrated model is able to replicate the above stylized facts. We take this to be preliminary,
indirect evidence that the selection process (rather than the contact process) must play a
major role in generating the observed labor market dynamics. Obviously, more empirical
evidence is required to shed light on this issue. We expect the question of "outreach" versus
"match suitability" to be an important issue for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model two-
sided selection in terms of optimizing decisions. Section 3 shows that this simple incentive
model cannot be replicated by a conventional search model with an encompassing matching
function. Section 4 presents an extended incentive model, which is calibrated in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the numerical results and Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Incentive Model
To set the stage, we begin by constructing a particularly simple model of the incentive
theory of matching, based on heterogeneous match-speci￿c shocks. We make the standard
assumption that unemployed workers search for jobs, while employed workers do not. Our
model has the following sequence of labor market decisions. First, vacancies are posted.
Second, the realized values of the match-speci￿c shocks are revealed. Third, the ￿rms make
their hiring decisions and the households make their job acceptance decisions. To keep our
analysis particularly simple, we assume that every searcher makes contact with a vacancy
each period.
This assumption is equivalent to a trivial contact function: Ct = Ut￿1, where Ct is the
5number of contacts (interviews) made in period t and Ut￿1 is the number of unemployed job
searchers in the previous period. In addition, we assume in this section that the real wage
w is exogenously given.11 Finally, to provide a maximally transparent comparison of our
incentive model and the standard matching model, we assume that workers and ￿rms are
myopic (i.e. their rates of time discount are 100%).12
2.1 The Firm￿ s Behavior
We assume that the pro￿t generated by a particular worker at a particular job is subject
to a match-speci￿c random shock "t in period t, which is meant to capture idiosyncratic
variations in workers￿suitability for the available jobs.13 For example, workers in a particular
skill group and sector may exhibit heterogeneous pro￿tabilities due to random variations in
their state of health, levels of concentration, and mobility costs, or to random variations in
￿rms￿operating costs, screening, training, and monitoring costs, and so on. The random
shock "t is positive and iid across workers, with a stable probability density function G" ("t),
known to the ￿rm.14 Let the corresponding cumulative distribution be J" ("t)15.
In each period of analysis a new value of "t is realized for each worker.
The average productivity of each worker is a, a positive constant. The hiring cost h
per worker is also a constant. The hiring cost includes the administrative costs, screening
costs, retraining costs, and relocation costs, as well as the basic instruction, mentoring and
on-the-job training costs that are required to integrate the worker in the ￿rm￿ s workforce.
The pro￿t generated by an entrant (a newly hired worker) is
￿
E
t = a ￿ "t ￿ w ￿ h, (1)
where the superscript ￿E￿stands for ￿entrant￿and w is the real wage.
The ￿rm￿ s ￿job o⁄er incentive￿(its payo⁄from hiring a worker) is the di⁄erence between
its gross pro￿t16 from hiring an entrant worker (a ￿ w ￿ h) and its pro￿t from not doing
(namely, zero):
￿
E = a ￿ w ￿ h. (2)
11This assumption is relaxed in the next section, where wages are determined through bargaining.
12This assumption is also relaxed in the next section.
13Since each worker draws from the same distribution of random shocks, "it, we omit the subscript i for
notational simplicity.
14Our analysis can of course be extended straightforwardly to shocks with AR and MA components.




16This "gross" pro￿t is the expected pro￿t generated by hiring an unemployed worker, without taking the
match-speci￿c shock "t into account.
6The ￿rm o⁄ers this job to a worker whenever that worker generates positive pro￿t: "t < ￿E.






The ￿rm￿ s ￿retention incentive￿ (its payo⁄ from retaining a worker) is the di⁄erence
between its gross pro￿t from retaining a worker is (a ￿ w) and the (negative) pro￿t from
￿ring that worker:
￿
I = a ￿ w + f, (4)
where the superscript ￿I￿stands for the incumbent employee who has been retained, and
f is the ￿ring cost per worker, assumed constant. The ￿rm with a ￿lled job will ￿re an
incumbent worker whenever she generates negative pro￿t: "t > ￿I. Thus the ￿ring rate is:





Note that due to the hiring and ￿ring costs, the retention incentive exceeds the job o⁄er
incentive (￿I > ￿E) and thus the retention rate exceeds the job o⁄er rate ((1 ￿ ￿) > ￿).
2.2 The Worker￿ s Behavior
The worker faces a discrete choice of whether or not to work. If she works, her disutility of
work e⁄ort is et, a random variable, which is iid, with a stable probability density function
Ge (et), known to the worker. The corresponding cumulative distribution is Je (et). The
random variable captures match-speci￿c heterogeneities in the disagreeability of work, due to
such factors as idiosyncratic reactions to particular workplaces or variations in the qualities
of these workplaces. The worker￿ s utility is linear in consumption and work e⁄ort. She
consumes all her income. If she is unemployed, her utility is ￿U = b, a constant. If she is
employed, her utility is ￿N
t = w ￿ et.17
A worker￿ s ￿work incentive￿(her payo⁄from choosing to work) is the di⁄erence between
her gross utility18 from working (w) and her utility from not working (b):
￿ = (w ￿ b). (6)
Assuming that w > b and letting E (et) = 0; all unemployed workers have an ex ante incentive
17Observe that on the ￿rm￿ s side, we distinguish between entrants (E) and incumbent workers (I); whereas
on the workers￿side, we distinguish between employed (N) and unemployed (U) workers. The rationale for
these two distinctions is that the ￿rm can hire two types of workers (entrants and incumbents), whereas the
worker can be in two states (employment and unemployment).
18This "gross" utility is the expected utility generated by employment, without taking the match-speci￿c
shock e into account.
7to seek work.
An unemployed worker will accept a job o⁄er whenever et < ￿. This means that the job
acceptance rate is
￿ = Je (￿). (7)
Along the same lines, an employed worker will decide to quit when et > ￿. This means that
the quit rate is
￿ = 1 ￿ Je (￿). (8)
Note that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the job acceptance rate is identical to
the job retention rate (￿ = 1 ￿ ￿). When unemployed workers face costs of adjusting to
employment (e.g. buying a car to get to work, or psychic costs of changing one￿ s daily
routine) or when employed workers face costs of adjusting to unemployment (e.g. building
networks of friends with potential job contacts, psychic costs of adjusting to joblessness),
then the job acceptance rate would fall short of the job retention rate.19
2.3 Match and Separation Probabilities
An unemployed worker gets a job when two conditions are ful￿lled: (i) she receives a job
o⁄er and (ii) she accepts that o⁄er. Thus the match probability (￿) is the product of the job
o⁄er rate (￿) and the job acceptance rate (￿):
￿ = ￿￿. (9)
An employee separates from her job when at least one of two conditions is satis￿ed: (i)
she is ￿red or (ii) she quits. Thus the separation probability is
￿ = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿. (10)
19Speci￿cally, for example, the unemployed worker￿ s job acceptance incentive could be expressed as ￿U =
w ￿ b ￿ ￿U , where ￿U is the cost of adjusting to employment, and the incumbent worker￿ s job retention
incentive could be expressed as ￿N = w ￿b+￿N, where ￿N is the cost of adjusting to unemployment. Then
the job acceptance rate becomes ￿ = Ce
￿
￿U￿
, the job retention rate becomes Ce
￿
￿N￿
so that the quit rate





Vacancies are posted before "t is realized. As in the conventional search literature, we assume
free entry of ￿rms, so that the number of vacancies is determined by a zero-pro￿t condition.20
Let V be the number of vacancies posted, ￿ be the cost of posting a vacancy, and Ut￿1 be
the number of unemployed in the previous period. If Vt ￿ Ut￿1, then the probability that a
vacancy is ￿lled is (Ut￿1=Vt)￿t, i.e. the probability of a contact times the probability that the
contact leads to a match. The expected pro￿t per match is
￿
a ￿ w ￿ h ￿ Et
￿
"tj"t < ￿E￿￿
Thus the zero-pro￿t condition for posting vacancies is
￿(Ut￿1=Vt)
￿




￿ ￿ = 0; (11)











If Vt < Ut￿1, then all vacancies are ￿lled and if the expected pro￿t from posting a
vacancy is Et (￿t) = ￿
￿
a ￿ w ￿ h ￿ Et
￿
"tj"t < ￿E￿￿
￿ ￿ > 0, then the ￿rm continues to
post vacancies until V ￿ = Ut￿1 (for which eq (12) applies).
2.5 The Labor Market Equilibrium
Given that all unemployed people are job searchers and assuming that each job searcher
makes one contact per period, the number of unemployed workers who get jobs in period t
is ￿Ut￿1, where Ut￿1 is the number of unemployed in the previous period.21 The number of
employed people who separate from their jobs in period t is ￿Nt￿1, where Nt￿1 is the number
of employed in the previous period.
The change in employment is ￿Nt = Nt ￿ Nt￿1 = ￿Ut￿1 ￿ ￿Nt￿1. Let L be the labor
force, while n = N=L and u = U=L be rates of employment and unemployment, respectively,
so that ut = 1 ￿ nt: Normalizing the labor force to unity, equilibrium employment nt may
be described by the following employment equation:
nt = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)nt￿1, (13)
where the degree of employment persistence, measured by the parameter (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿), de-
20Note that we do not have to specify the number of ￿rms, as they face constant returns (there is only an
ex-post heterogeneity, once there are particular worker-￿rm pairs).
21All other variables (without subscripts) refer to the current period.
9pends inversely on the matching rate and separation rate.22
Substituting ut = 1￿nt into the vacancy equation (12), we obtain the equilibrium number
of vacanices. Observe that vacancies play no allocative role in our model: the number of
vacancies has no e⁄ect on employment and unemployment. The reason is that vacancies do
not in￿ uence the number of contacts made by a given number of unemployed job searchers,
since we have assumed that the number of contacts is equal to the number of job searchers.
In this context, vacancies are simply an "attention-seeking device:" the greater the number
of vacancies that a ￿rm posts for a given job, the greater the number of job applicants
it attracts relative to other ￿rms. The greater is the aggregate number of vacancies, the
lower is the probability that they will be ￿lled by a given number of job searchers and in
the labor market equilibrium, the aggregate number of vacancies has no e⁄ect on aggregate
employment.
3 The Encompassing Matching-Function as Descrip-
tion of Contact and Selection
Assuming the incentive model above to be the "true" description of the labor market, we ask
whether it is possible to specify a corresponding model with a stable encompassing matching
function ￿to be called the "encompassing matching model" ￿so as to replicate the behavior
of the incentive model, for any values of the model￿ s macroeconomic and policy parameters.
We show that, in general, this is not possible. For such replication to occur, the encompassing
matching function generally needs to shift in response to macroeconomic and policy changes.
23
22An alternative interpretation of the persistence parameter is given by 1￿￿ ￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿c￿￿,
where (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿), the product of the incumbents￿retention rate and staying rate, is the incumbents￿
survival rate. Thus the persistence parameter is the di⁄erence between the incumbents￿survival rate and
the unemployed workers￿match probability.
23Various authors (e.g. Lagos, 2000) have noted that policies which a⁄ect labor market heterogeneities
(e.g. retraining programs), frictions (e.g. job counselling) and information imperfections (e.g. job exchanges)
may naturally be expected to in￿ uence the matching function. In short, there is no reason to believe that
the matching function is invariant with respect to labor market policies that are designed to improve the
matching process. Our analysis shows, however, that the Lucas critique extends well beyond such policies.
Several empirical studies indicate instabilities of the matching function. Often a negative time trend is
found when estimating the search and matching function, thus casting doubt on the stability through time
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, for the United States, and Fahr and Sunde, 2001, 2004, for Germany).
103.1 The Encompassing Matching Model
We now specify an encompassing matching model, which is the counterpart to the incentive
model above, with an encompassing matching function. Let the matching function be
Ct = Ct (Ut￿1;Vt). (14)
This function satis￿es the standard conditions: C0
i > 0, C0
ii < 0, i = U;V ; Ct (Ut￿1;0) =
Ct (0;Vt) = 0; and there are constant returns to scale: ￿Ct (Ut￿1;Vt) = Ct (￿Ut￿1;￿Vt)
where ￿ is any positive constant.
Let ￿t = Vt=Ut￿1 denote labor market tightness, so that qt (￿t) = Ct (Ut￿1=Vt;1) is the
probability that a job is matched with a worker, and ￿q (￿) is the probability that a worker
is matched by a job. Along the lines of the simple labor market matching models, we
assume that jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate ￿, 0 < ￿ < 1: Then the change in the
employment rate is24 ￿nt = ￿q (￿)(1 ￿ nt￿1) ￿ ￿nt￿1, implying the following employment
dynamics equation:
nt = ￿q (￿t) + (1 ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ ￿)nt￿1. (15)
Vacancies are posted until the expected pro￿t is reduced to zero: a￿w = ￿
qt(￿t), where ￿ is
a vacancy posting cost, ￿=qt (￿t) is the expected vacancy posting cost per worker. Expressing







where g = q￿1.
The equilibrium employment rate n is obtained by substituting the zero-pro￿t condition
(16) into the employment dynamics equation (15).
3.2 Equivalence Condition
In order for the two models to be comparable, let the exogenous wage w be identical in both
models and suppose that the separation rate ￿ in the incentive model is a constant equal
to the job destruction rate ￿ in the conventional matching model. Then the two models are
observationally equivalent when ￿q (￿)+(1 ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ ￿)nt￿1 = ￿+(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)nt￿1, so that
￿q (￿) = ￿, (17)
24To keep this model comparable with our the simple incentive model above, we assume (without loss of
generality) the same timing in both models. Matches are not destroyed in the match period and they become
immediately productive.








= J" (a ￿ w ￿ h)Je (w ￿ b). (18)
For given cumulative distributions J" and Je, can a matching function g be found, so that
the condition (18) holds for any values of the parameters which the incentive model and the
conventional matching model have in common? To answer this question, we di⁄erentiate












































Conditions (19) and (20) are mutually exclusive, unless the slope of the cumulative dis-
tribution of e is J0
e = 0. The latter implies that the underlying density is Ge = 0. This
occurs when there exist no households with a marginal disutility of e⁄ort e over the relevant
range. (It is on this account that the number of households that accept jobs is not a⁄ected by
(w ￿ b):) A distribution of e with zero mass is indeed a special case; it amounts to excluding
the possibility of heterogeneous workers in our model.
Conditions (19) and (21) are mutually exclusive, unless the slope of the cumulative dis-
tribution of "t is J0
" = 0; which implies that the underlying density is G" = 0. This occurs
when there exist no jobs with workplace heterogeneities "t over the relevant range, i.e. the
possibility of heterogeneous pro￿tabilities is excluded.
In short, there exists no functional form for g such that condition (18) always holds
- for any given cumulative distributions J" and Je, and for any values of the parameters
common to the two models - unless heterogeneities on the ￿rm and households side are
absent. Thus the encompassing matching model is not observationally equivalent to the
incentive model with heterogenous ￿rms and households. If the incentive model above is
assumed to be the ￿true￿model of the labor market, then the standard matching model can
reproduce the ￿true￿employment e⁄ects of variations in all the relevant parameters ￿the
wage w, productivity a, the hiring cost h, or the leisure utility b ￿only if we assume that
12the matching function is modi￿ed whenever these parameters are changed.
It is clear that this non-equivalence also applies to more complicated models (such as
the one in the next section), for the underlying idea is quite general: For any encompass-
ing matching function - speci￿ed independently of the optimizing decisions relevant to the
selection process - it is always possible to construct a microfounded macro model that sys-
tematically fools this matching function.
The basic intuition underlying this result is straightforward. Although it is often claimed
that the matching function is analogous to a production function, an important di⁄erence
stands out. A ￿rm￿ s production function captures the portfolio of available technologies, and
these are indeed often invariant with respect to many policy and macroeconomic variations.
By contrast, the encompassing matching function summarizes the market activity generated
by the decisions of ￿rms and workers, responding to their individual incentives to create jobs,
and these incentives are in general not invariant with respect to policy and macroeconomic
variations. On the contrary, policy changes and macroeconomic shocks usually a⁄ect ￿rms￿
incentives to o⁄er jobs and workers￿incentives to accept them. Thus the relation between
new hires and match inputs is mediated by these policy and macroeconomic variations.
On this account, the encompassing matching function may be expected to change when
these variations occur. This calls into question the usefulness of the encompassing matching
function for forecasting or policy analysis.
In short, our analysis suggests that an encompassing matching function is not suitable
for describing the selection process, and should be replaced by a microfounded model in
which new hires are explained in terms of the optimizing decisions of ￿rms and workers in
the presence of heterogeneous contacts.25
4 A Dynamic Incentive Model
We now relax several restrictive assumptions of the incentive model above ￿that households
and ￿rms are myopic, wages are exogenous, productivity is constant, each searcher ￿nds a
distinct vacancy ￿in order to examine the relative performance of the incentive model and
the standard matching model in accounting for well-known stylized facts. In the context
of conventional calibrations, we will show that the incentive model fares better than the
standard matching model in reproducing the volatilities of major labor market variables.
Speci￿cally, we extend the simple model above by
25While various other authors have modeled the matching process without resorting to a matching function
(e.g. Hall, 1977, Lagos, 2000, Shimer, 2007, and others), our analysis explicitly focuses on two-sided search
(i.e. search by both workers and ￿rms at the same time).
13￿ including aggregate risk: the average aggregate productivity parameter a is now subject
to random productivity shocks;
￿ allowing for rates of time discount that are less than 100%, so that workers and ￿rms
become intertemporal optimizers;
￿ introducing wage determination through bargaining; and
￿ allowing the number of contacts to depend on both the number of job searchers and
the number of vacancies.
The ￿rst extension enables us to simulate productivity shocks as done in Hall (2005),
Shimer (2005) and numerous other papers and to make our framework quantitatively com-
parable to the matching theory. The second and third extensions provide a richer depiction
of the determinants of employment and wages. The fourth enables us to include a non-trivial
contact function.
In the context of our extended model, the sequence of decisions may be summarized
as follows. First, vacancies are posted. Second, the aggregate productivity shock and the
idiosyncratic shocks are revealed. Third, the wage is set through bargaining. Fourth, the
￿rms make their hiring and ￿ring decisions and the households make their job acceptance
and refusal decisions, taking the wage and the realization of the aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks as given. We proceed to consider these decisions in reverse order.
4.1 The Firm￿ s Behavior
The ￿rm maximizes the present value of its expected pro￿t, with a time discount factor ￿.
4.1.1 The Firing Decision
The expected present value of pro￿t generated by an incumbent employee, after the random













































is the expectation of the random term "t+1, conditional on this shock
falling short of the incumbent employee￿ s retention incentive ￿I
t , which is de￿ned as
￿
I







i.e. the retention incentive is the di⁄erence between the gross expected pro￿t from retaining
the employed worker
￿





and the expected pro￿t from
￿ring her (￿f).
An incumbent worker is ￿red in period t when the realized value of the random cost "t is
greater than the incumbent worker￿ s employment incentive: "t > ￿I
t . Since the cumulative





, the employed worker￿ s ￿ring rate is







4.1.2 The Job O⁄er Decision
The expected present value of pro￿t generated by an entrant, given that a contact has been














We de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s expected job o⁄er incentive ￿E
t as the di⁄erence between the gross






pro￿t from not hiring him (i.e. zero):
￿
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A job is o⁄ered when ￿E








4.2 The Worker￿ s Behavior





















is the expected present value of utility of the following period (before the


































An unemployed worker￿ s expected ￿work incentive￿￿t is the expected gross di⁄erence26










Thus the unemployed accepts a job o⁄er when et < ￿t.Consequently, the job acceptance
rate is
￿t = Je (￿t). (33)
The incumbent worker decides to quit his job when the present value of becoming unem-

















= ￿t. Thus the
quit rate is
￿t = 1 ￿ Je (￿t). (34)
4.3 Employment
Let Ct be the number of contacts made in period t and ct be an unemployed worker￿ s contact
probability:
ct = Ct=Ut￿1:
Then the match probability is the product of the contact, matching and acceptance proba-
bilities:
￿t = ct￿t￿t. (35)
As in the one-period incentive model, the separation probability is
￿t = ￿t + ￿t ￿ ￿t￿t, (36)
26"Gross" means that the utility shock et is not taken into account.
16and the associated employment dynamics equation is
nt = ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t)nt￿1: (37)
4.4 Wage Determination
We now endogenize the real wage through bargaining. We assume here that wage bargaining
takes place before the job o⁄er, acceptance, ￿ring and quit decisions are made. Our aim is
to formulate a wage determination model that is (i) simple and tractable, (ii) comparable to
the wage bargaining process in the conventional matching models and (iii) able to reproduce
the stylized fact that wages are as volatile as productivity. Accordingly, we assume that
the incumbent workers and entrants receive the same wage wt,27 determined through Nash
bargaining between the ￿rm and its median incumbent worker. The median worker faces
no risk of dismissal, as he is at the middle of the " distribution. These assumptions satisfy
the three aims above, because (i) the simplify the analysis by allowing the employment rate
to depend on the wage, but not vice versa, (ii) the Nash bargaining between the ￿rm and
the median incumbent is comparable to the wage bargaining in the conventional matching
models, and (iii) the negotiated wage turns out to be as volatile as productivity. It can
be shown that individualistic wage bargaining leads to results similar to those here ￿in
particular, to comparably high labor market volatilies (see Appendix A.1) ￿suggesting that
our results are not driven by our particularly simple bargaining model.28
The wage bargain takes place in each period of analysis. In the current period t, under
bargaining agreement, the median incumbent worker receives the wage wt incurs e⁄ort cost
eM and the ￿rm receives the expected pro￿t
￿
at ￿ wt ￿ "M ￿
in each period t. Thus the
expected present value of the median incumbent worker￿ s utility E(￿M














The expected present value of ￿rm￿ s returns under bargaining agreement are
27This assumption also implies that an increase in wages leads to a fall in employment. This employment
e⁄ect can of course also be generated when incumbent workers and entrants have di⁄erent wages. For exam-
ple, Lindbeck and Snower (2001) provide a variety of reasons why entrants do not receive their reservation
wage and thus a rise in incumbent workers￿wages is not met a counterveiling fall in entrant wages, and
thus a rise in incumbent workers￿wage lead to a fall in employment. In the context of a Markov model,
Diaz-Vazquez and Snower (2003) show that incumbent workers￿wages are inversely related to aggregate
employment even when entrants receive their reservation wages.
28Note also that under indivdualistic bargaining, the household and ￿rm decisions can not be disentangled,



















Under disagreement in bargaining, the incumbent worker￿ s fallback income is d, which
can be conceived as ￿nancial support from family and friends, strike pay out of a union
fund, or other forms of support. The ￿rm￿ s fallback pro￿t is ￿z, a constant. Assuming that
disagreement in the current period does not a⁄ect future returns, the present value of utility




























































= wt ￿ d ￿ e
M, (42)
































= at ￿ wt ￿ "
M + z. (43)






at ￿ wt + z ￿ "
M ￿1￿￿
, (44)
where ￿ represents the bargaining strength of the incumbent worker relative to the ￿rm.
Thus the negotiated wage is
wt = ￿
￿
at + z ￿ "
M￿













where ￿ is the contact elasticity and ￿ contact e¢ ciency. As in the traditional search models,
the number of vacancies V ￿
t is determined through a zero-pro￿t condition:
























where the vacancy posting cost is ￿ and the expected vacancy posting cost30 is ￿Vt
￿t￿tUt￿1.
4.6 The Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium is the solution of the system comprising the following equa-
tions:
￿ Incentives: the incumbent worker retention incentive ￿I
t (eq. 24), the job o⁄er incentive
￿E
t (eq. 27) and the work incentive ￿t (eq. 32).
￿ Employment decisions: the ￿ring rate ￿t (eq. 25) and the job o⁄er rate ￿t (eq. 28).
￿ Work decisions: the job acceptance rate ￿t (eq. 33) and the quit rate ￿t (eq. 34).
￿ Contacts and vacancies: the contact function Ct (eq. 46) and the number of vacancies
V ￿ (eq.47).
￿ Match and separation probabilities: the match probability ￿t (eq. 35) and the separa-
tion probability ￿t (eq. 36).





















We now calibrate our incentive model for the US economy. The calibration is done on a
monthly basis. The simulation results are aggregated to quarterly frequency to make them
comparable to the empirical data, as for example in Shimer (2005).
Our monthly discount factor ￿ = 1
1+r is consistent with an annual real interest rate of
4 percent. We normalize the average productivity (a) to 1. As in Hall (2005) and Shimer
(2005), we set b by applying a replacement rate of ￿ = 40% of the wage. For simplicity, we
set d = b. As commonly found in the literature we adopt a bargaining power parameter of
￿ = 0:5.
In this section, we begin with the simplifying assumption, which will be relaxed later,
that ￿ = 1, so that each unemployed worker makes one distinct contact in each period:
Ct = Ut￿1, implying a contact rate of unity: ct = 1. (In the next section, this assumption is
relaced by the standard Cobb-Douglas contact function, with 0 < ￿ < 1.) Furthermore, we
normalize ￿ to unity. The vacancy posting costs ￿ of 0.19 are chosen to satisfy the zero-pro￿t
condition.
Dol￿n (2006) shows that an average U.S. worker spends 203 hours in training activi-
ties during her ￿rst three months of employment, while other employees spend around 146
training her. In line with this evidence, we set hiring costs, h, to 130% of the monthly
productivity.31
The literature does not provide reliable direct estimates of the magnitude of US ￿ring
costs. Thus, we assess these costs indirectly. For this purpose, note that Belot et al. (2007)
provide index measures of employment protection for regular jobs in the US and UK, and
that Bentolila and Bertola (1990) provide estimates of the average magnitude of UK ￿ring
costs on a yearly basis.32 Assuming that the index measures of employment protection are
proportional to the estimates of the magnitude of ￿ring costs, we multiply the magnitude
of the UK ￿ring costs by the ratio of the US to the UK employment protection indeces to
derive a rough estimate of the magnitude of US ￿ring costs. Accordingly, the magnitude
of monthly US ￿ring costs, relative to productivity, is 0:08. The same exercise based on
other industrialized countries (France, Germany and Italy), however, yields higher estimates
of US ￿ring costs. Thus we choose a value of 0:1 for our baseline calibration, but provide
a robustness analysis for other values in Appendix A.2.33 For simplicity, we set the ￿rm￿ s
31We only take the direct training costs into account. We divide 203 by 8, thereby obtaining 25.4 working
days. Assuming 20 working days per month, this yields 1.3 months.
32We take averages over the time periods provided by these authors.
33Speci￿cally, we provide simulation results for ￿ring costs calculated relative to the UK, f = 0:08, and
as an upper bound we choose f = 0:2.
20fallback pro￿t ￿z equal to￿f.34
We assume that the random pro￿tability term "t and the utility shock et have cumulative
distributions given by logistic functions with scale factors s" and se and expected values ￿ "
and ￿ e, respectively.35 We calibrate our model such that it replicates the stylized fact that
wages are as volatile as productivity.36 This is achieved by setting ￿ e = 0:17. Thereby our
calibration excludes the possibility that our results are driven by real wage rigidity.
After having set all our other parameter values, we set the remaining three free dis-
tributional parameters (the average operating costs ￿ ", the scale factor of the cumulative
distribution of s"; the scale factor of the cumulative distribution of se) to replicate three
steady state labor market ￿ ow rates: the job acceptance rate ￿, the job o⁄er rate ￿, and the
￿ring rate ￿. These steady state values are calibrated as follows. The match probability ￿,
which is the probability for a worker to ￿nd a new job within one period, is calibrated to
45%37, as in Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manvoskii (2008). The unemployment rate u
is calibrated to 5:6% (as in Shimer, 2005). According to our employment dynamics equation
(13) steady state unemployment is u =
￿
￿+￿ which implies a separation rate of 2:68%. Based
on Hall (2006), who shows that ￿res and quits have approximately the same share in separa-
tion, we assume ￿rings to account for 50% of the separations, namely ￿ = 1:34%. Eq. (36)
then yields the quit rate of ￿ = 1:36%. Since ￿ is equal to 1 ￿ ￿; the job acceptance rate
is set at 98:64%: Recalling that ￿ = c￿￿ and that we have assumed c = 1, the implied job
o⁄er rate ￿ is 45:6%:We determine the number of vacancies by assuming a market tightness
equal to 1.
The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock is of signi￿cant impor-
tance for the aggregate dynamics, since the lower it is, the stronger are the reactions to
productivity in our model. Our calibration strategy yields a standard deviation of the idio-
syncratic productivity shock of ￿" = 0:57, which is narrower than values commonly used in
the literature (e.g. Den Haan et al., 2000, choose ￿" = 0:1, Krause and Lubik, 2007, use
￿" = 0:12 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, choose ￿" = 0:0375). Using this conserva-
tive value we bias the dynamics against our model and this ensures that our volatilities are
not driven by an unrealistically small standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity
34Here we implicitly assume that during disagreement the incumbent worker imposes the maximal cost on
the ￿rm short of inducing dismissal.
35The cumulative logistic distribution is very close to the cumulative normal distribution.
36See Hornstein et al. (2005).
37Note: In our model the worker ￿nding rate (i.e., the probability of a ￿rm to ￿nd a new worker) and the
job ￿nding rate (i.e., the probability of a worker to ￿nd a new) are the same.
21shock.38
We normalize the autocorrelation (￿a) of the aggregate productivity shock and normalize
the standard error such that we obtain the empirical values for the autocorrelation and the
volatility of productivity in the model simulation below. Table 2 summarizes our calibrated
parameter values.
Variable In Words Steady State Value
u unemployment rate 0:056
￿ match probability 0:450
c contact rate 1
￿ hiring/job o⁄er rate 0:456
￿ separation rate 0:0268
￿ ￿ring rate 0:0134
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ job quit rate 0:0136
￿ market tightness 1
Table 1: Steady state values for a contact function Ct = Ut￿1, i.e. ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1
Parameter In Words Value
a productivity 1
￿ replacement rate b
w; d
w 0:4
f ￿ring cost 0:1
h hiring cost 1:3
￿ contact e¢ ciency 1
￿ contact elasticity 1
￿ vacancy posting cost 0:188
￿ workers￿bargaining strength 0:5
r discount factor 0:997
￿z ￿rm￿ s fallback pro￿t ￿0:1
￿ e average value of leisure 0:17
￿ " average operating costs 0:51
s" scale factor of the cumulative distribution of "t 0:313
se scale factor of the cumulative distribution of et 0:058
￿a autocorrelation of the aggregate productivity shock 0:975
$a standard error of the aggregate productivity shock 0:007
Table 2: Parameter values for a contact function Ct = Ut￿1, i.e. ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1:
38While the standard deviation of the idiosynchratic utility schock is indeed small, ￿e = 0:1, under our
calibration the household acts countercyclical, which counteracts and dampens the e⁄ect of the idiosynchratic
productivity schock on unemployment.
226 Description of Results
6.1 Labor Market Volatilies
Costain and Reiter (2008) and Shimer (2005) show that the conventional calibration of the
matching model is unable to replicate the volatility of the job ￿nding rate, the unemploy-
ment rate, and other labor market variables in response to productivity shocks. Table 3
shows that the empirical volatilities for the United States (from 1951-2003, HP ￿ltered data
with smoothing parameter 100,000, as calculated by Shimer) are far greater than the cor-
responding volatilities in response to productivity shocks, as generated by the simulation of
the conventional matching model (in its standard calibration, as calculated by Shimer).
Empirical Labor Market Statistics by Shimer (2005), from 1951-2003
Volatilities U. Rate Match. R. Sep. Rate Vac. M. Tight. Prod.
Standard deviation 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.38 0.02
Relative to productivity 9.5 5.9 3.8 10.1 19.1 1
Quarterly autocorr. 0.94 0.91 0.73 0.94 0.94 0.88
Correlations U,V JCR, JDR
-0.89 -0.36
Labor Market Statistics by Shimer￿ s (2005) Search and Matching Model
Volatilities U. Rate Match. R. Sep. Rate Vac. M. Tight. Prod.
Standard deviation 0.01 0.01 - 0.03 0.04 0.02
Relative to productivity 0.5 0.5 - 1.4 1.8 1
Quarterly autocorr. 0.94 0.88 - 0.84 0.88 0.88
Correlations U,V JCR, JDR
-0.93 -
Table 3: Empirical labor market statistics and those generated by the search and matching
model from Shimer (2005).39
To compare our model with the conventional matching theory, we use our baseline cali-
bration (with robustness checks in the Appendix B) to simulate our model for 200 quarters
(i.e. 600 months). We repeat this exercise 1000 times and report the average of the macroeco-
39The correlation between job creation and job destruction is not available in Shimer (2005). The empirical
correlation is taken from Krause and Lubik (2007).
23nomic volatilities (HP ￿ltered simulated data with smoothing parameter 100,000) in Table
4.40
Standard Calibration
Volatilities U. Rate Match. R. Sep. Rate Vac. M. Tight. Prod.
Standard deviation 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.09 0.31 0.02
Relative to productivity 8.8 9.2 0.5 4.6 15.5 1
Quarterly autocorr. 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.56 0.85 0.88
Correlations U, V JCR, JDR
-0.71 -0.06
Table 4: Labor market statistics generated by the incentive model of matching
The di⁄erences between our model and the conventional matching model are striking.
Our model can generate the high macroeconomic volatilities found in the data. Our results
are all the more remarkable, as we do not neither have to resort to Hall￿ s (2005) real wage
rigidity assumption nor to Hagedorn and Manovskii￿ s (2008) small surplus calibration.
Speci￿cally, the more rigid the wage in the conventional matching model (Hall, 2005), the
greater the share of productivity variations that is captured by the ￿rm and thus the greater
the volatility of vacancies. However, there is evidence against the rigid-wage hypothesis both
from the microeconometric and the macro perspective. Haefke et al. (2008) infer that wages
for newly created jobs (i.e., those modeled in the matching model) are completely ￿ exible
on a microeconomic level. Hornstein et al. (2005) show that wages are roughly as volatile
as the labor productivity on a macroeconomic level. By contrast, our model generates high
labor market volatilities, even though it replicates the stylized fact that wages are as volatile
as productivity.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) choose a small-surplus calibration to resolve the volatility
puzzle of the matching model. Under this calibration, aggregate pro￿ts are only a very small
share of the overall production in the steady state, so that a positive productivity shock
sharply increases the relative pro￿ts. This gives a large incentive to ￿rms to post more
vacancies (due to the free entry condition). Consequently, all labor market variables become
volatile. This type of calibration has several shortcomings. Besides the unrealistically low
pro￿t share, the utility value of unemployment is extremely high and workers￿bargaining
power is very low in the calibration. Therefore workers are almost indi⁄erent between working
and not working. We do not need to rely on any of these mechanisms in our calibration. As
40The correlation between job destruction and job creation is calculated as the correlation between the
separation rate and the proportion of new jobs ￿tut￿1=nt￿1.
24noted, we assume that worker￿ s bargaining power is 50 percent. Furthermore, the average
worker￿ s disutility of labor and unemployment bene￿ts make up only 60 percent of the
current wage. As a consequence, the average worker is nowhere near indi⁄erent between
unemployment and employment.
6.2 Correlations
Our model features several additional advantages compared to the conventional matching
framework. Krause and Lubik (2007) show that the matching model with endogenous job
destruction and ￿ exible wages cannot generate a negative correlation between the between
job destruction and job creation (as in the data). In our model, the correlation between job
creation and job destruction (namely, -0.06) has the appropriate sign.
Further, in a matching model with endogenous job destruction and ￿ exible wages, the
negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment disappears (i.e., the dynamic Bev-
eridge Curve). In our simulation, we obtain a strong negative correlation between vacancies
and unemployment (namely, -0.71).41
7 Outreach versus Suitability Assessment
In this section we seek to shed light on the roles of outreach (of the contact stage) and
match suitability assessment (of the selection stage) in generating the well-known stylized
facts described above. The outreach phenomenon ￿jobless workers and workerless employers
reaching out to one another without knowing the identity of the other party ￿is captured by
the contact function in our model; whereas the suitability assessment phenomenon ￿having
made contact, the two parties examine whether a match would be suitable (i.e. would
generate a positive surplus) ￿ is captured by two-sided optimization over heterogeneous
agents. As noted, the conventional search models with an encompassing matching function
focus solely on outreach (as all job searchers and all vacancies are treated as homogeneous).
In the models with exogenous separations (e.g. Shimer, 2005), suitability is invariant over
the business cycle (since a constant fraction of contacts is broken in each period, equal
to the fraction of employment relationships that is broken). Finally, in the productivity-
perturbation models with endogenous separations (e.g. den Haan, et al, 2000, Krause and
Lubik, 2007), suitability varies over the cycle, but (as discussed) these models have the
41We calculate the dynamic Beveridge curve as the correlation between contemporaneous unemployment
and vacancies. If we used the lagged unemployment, we would obtain a correlation of -0.61, i.e., there remains
a strong negative relationship. Many empirical studies use the contemporaneous correlation. Therefore, we
do the same to be in line with the data. The reality might lie somewhere in between.
25counterfactual implication that the hiring probability after a contact is made is equal to the
retention probability. In practice, however, the retention probability is substantially larger
than the hiring probability, and thus the selection decisions underlying the suitability of
incumbents di⁄er from the selection decisions underlying the suitability of entrants. Our
model can account for this di⁄erence, since it includes linear hiring and ￿ring costs that
drive a wedge between the hiring probability and the retention probability.
In the calibration of the previous section, the outreach phenomenon had a very limited
role to play in explaining labor market activity, since we assumed the contact elasticity
to be ￿ = 1 and the contact e¢ ciency ￿ = 1, implying the trivial contact function Ct =
Ut￿1. In this case, as noted, vacancies are simply an attention-seeking device and play no
allocational role. Speci￿cally, observe that since the contact probability is ct = Ct=Ut￿1 = 1,
the employment dynamics equation (37) reduces to nt = ￿t￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t￿t)nt￿1, where
the hiring probability ￿t, the job acceptance probability ￿t, and the separation probability
￿t are all independent of the number of vacancies.
To examine how the labor market volatilities depend on the exogenous contact proba-
bility, we perform the calibration above for di⁄erent values of the contact probability ct by
varying the contact e¢ ciency ￿ in the trivial contact function, i.e. for a contact elasticity of
￿ = 1. The results are given in Table 5.42
Volatilities (std. dev. relative to productivity) Correlations
c = ￿ U. Rate Match. R. Sep. Rate Vac. M. Tight. U,V JCR,JDR
1 8.9 9.2 0.5 4.6 15.5 -0.71 -0.06
0.8 11.5 7.7 3.4 3.6 15.1 -0.42 0.64
0.6 21.3 5.0 11.4 4.5 13.5 0.49 0.88
Table 5: Labor market statistics for various contact rates c:
Note that as the contact probability falls, the elasticity of vacancies with respect to
productivity declines, since vacancies are less likely to lead to hires.43 Consequently, the
42The following calibration values di⁄er with respect to the values in Section 5 as follows:




￿ " 0:503 0:494
￿ 0:206 0:278
Table 6: Di⁄erence to the standard calibration for di⁄erent contact rates c.
43The correlation between unemployment and vacancies becomes positive with c=0.6. Thus, although the
standard deviation increases, vacancies move in the wrong direction.
26Beveridge Curve relation weakens, in the sense that negative shocks which raise unemploy-
ment do not depress vacancies as much (and conversely from positive shocks). As ￿rms and
households use the hiring and job acceptance margins less intensively to vary employment
(due to the lower contact probability), they compensate by using the ￿ring and quit margins
more intensively. Thus, the variability of the separation rate rises.
When the contact rate falls, the models generates smaller ampli￿cation e⁄ects for the
matching rate. However, the volatility of the unemployment rate depends on the matching-
rate volatility and the separation-rate volatility. Since the matching-rate volatility declines
and the separation-rate volatility rises as the contact probability falls, the joint e⁄ect on the
unemployment-rate volatility is ambiguous. Table 5 shows, however, that the e⁄ect of the
separation rate dominates, so that the volatility of the unemployment rate rises. But it can
be seen that the volatility of the separation rate becomes implausibly large for low contact
rates.
Finally, we assume that the contact elasticity is 0 < ￿ < 1, 44 as is standard in the
conventional search models. In this context, vacancies have an allocative role: Variations in
aggregate vacancies lead to variations in the contact probability (ceteris paribus) and thereby
a⁄ect aggregate employment. Table 6 shows the results of our calibration for various values
of the contact elasticity.45
Volatilities (std. dev. relative to productivity) Correlations
c￿ = ￿ ￿ U rate Match. rate Sep. rate Vac. M. Tight. U,V JCR,JDR
0.8 0.75 7.1 8.9 0.8 5.4 14.9 -0.73 0.53
0.8 0.5 3.8 10.3 5.1 8.2 14.6 -0.87 0.98
0.6 0.75 11.2 6.3 4.3 3.1 12.5 -0.15 0.75
0.6 0.5 6.0 7.5 0.9 4.9 11.6 -0.76 0.60
Table 7: Labor market statistics for various steady state contact rates c￿ and contact
elasticities ￿
When ￿ is smaller than 1, vacancies become allocationally relevant in our model. Ob-
serve that a fall in the contact elasticity, ￿, leads to a stronger Beveridge Curve relation.
The reason is that as the contact elasticity, ￿, declines, vacancies become more important
relative to unemployment in generating contacts and thus the responsiveness of vacancies




45The following calibration values di⁄er with respect to the values in Table 6 as follows:
Param. c = ￿
0.9 0.7
￿=0.75 ￿=0.5 ￿=0.75 ￿=0.5
￿ 0.314 0.254 1.157 0.567
Table 8: Di⁄erences to the previous calibration for di⁄erent contact rates c and matching elasticities ￿:
27to productivity shocks rises. Not surprisingly, the variability of the unemployment rate falls
in response to a decline in the contact elasticity. The e⁄ect of the contact elasticity on the
variability of the matching rate is ambiguous: the reduced variability of unemployment and
the increased variability of vacancies pull in opposite directions with respect to the matching
rate.
Note that a reduction of the contact elasticity, ￿, generates counterfactual correlations
between labor market variables, for example the matching rate and the separation rate
exhibit an even stronger positive correlation. While this is a well-known feature of matching
model with endogenous separations (see, e.g., Krause and Lubik, 2007), in our model this
results from the countercyclical behaviour of the household-side, which overcompensates the
￿rm side on the separations margin.
Furthermore, note that as the contact elasticity falls beneath unity, the matching func-
tion plays an increasingly important role in determining the variability of unemployment,
vacancies, matching, and separations. When the contact elasticity is equal to unity, the
two distinctive features of the matching function - (i) the complementarity between unem-
ployment and vacancies in generating matches and (ii) the diminishing marginal product of
unemployment (declining e⁄ectiveness of unemployment to generate matches as unemploy-
ment increases, ceteris paribus) and the diminishing marginal product of vacancies - do not
come into play. As the contact elasticity drops from unity towards 0:5, these two features
become increasingly important, and the suitability of workers and ￿rms become correspond-
ingly less important. The diminishing marginal products help explain why the volatilities of
unemployment decline when the contact elasticity falls.
As the observed volatilities of these variables are replicated more closely by the model
when the contact elasticity is unity, this result suggests that the conventional contact function
￿in terms of its two distinctive features above ￿does not play a major role in explaining the
labor market volatilities above. In short, it is suitability assessment, rather than outreach,
that is responsible for our model￿ s success in replicating labor market volatilities. This
consideration helps justify our focus on the selection stage of matching ￿with incentive-
based, two-sided search among heterogeneous agents ￿rather than on the contact stage, as
in the conventional search literature.
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theory of labor market matching that distinguishes sharply
between contacts and selection. The selection takes place in the presence of frictions, het-
erogeneous jobs and heterogeneous workers. Our empirical results suggest that selection has
28a particularly important role to play in accounting for the observed labor market volatilities.
Our theory replaces the traditional, encompassing matching function by a contact func-
tion combined with optimizing, incentive-based, two-sided selection decisions. Our analysis
indicates that the encompassing matching function is vulnerable to the Lucas critique, since
it is not stable with respect to changes in policy and macroeconomic variables. Thus its use
for policy analysis and prediction becomes problematic.
The basic idea that motivates our incentive theory of matching is that the matching
and separation probabilities can be understood in terms of job o⁄er, job acceptance, ￿ring,
and quit probabilities, which may be derived from the optimizing decisions of ￿rms and
workers. These optimizing decisions ￿in the presence of heterogeneous workers and jobs, as
well as costs of adjustment ￿explain why some job-seeking workers remain unemployed and
some vacant jobs remain un￿lled. We have shown that, even on the basis of our radically
simplifying assumptions, our calibrated incentive model can account for various important
empirical regularities that have eluded the conventional matching models. In particular, our
model comes close to generating the empirically observed volatilities of the unemployment
rate, vacancies, the job ￿nding rate and the separation rate. Furthermore, our model can
also account for the observed strong negative correlations between the job ￿nding rate and
the unemployment rate, and between vacancies and unemployment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Labour Market Volatilities with Individualistic Bargaining
This Appendix shows that the median worker baraining does not drive the volatilities. We
derive the job creation, job destruction conditions and the wages. We then present the
resulting volatilities for this model.
A.1.1 Job Creation Condition
Assuming individualistic bargaining a ￿rm will hire a worker i when the following condition
holds
"t;i < at ￿ w
E
t;i (et;i) ￿ h + ￿Et (1 ￿ ￿t+1)￿
I
t+1 ￿ ￿￿t+1f, (48)
where the superscript N refers to an employed worker.
31We assume that the marginal entrant receives her reservation wage. This reservation
wage, for any given et;i, is
w
E
t;i = b + et;i ￿ ￿Et
 
(1 ￿ ￿t+1)￿N









where the superscripts U refers to an unemployed worker and FE to a future entrant, namely
a worker who will be an entrant in the next period.
There will be a job for a new worker whenever the following condition holds
"t;i + et;i < at ￿ h + ￿Et (1 ￿ ￿t+1)￿
I













i.e., the sum of the disutility and the operating cost shock are smaller than ￿rm￿ s present
value of pro￿ts and household￿ s expected present value of utility from working (not taking
the current wage into account). We de￿ne
￿
C
t = at ￿ h + ￿Et (1 ￿ ￿t+1)￿
I










































32A.1.2 Job Destruction Condition
et;i + "t;i >
￿
at + ￿Et (1 ￿ ￿t+1)￿
I












































Conditional expected value of the operating costs




















































































































Expected wage of a retained incumbent worker:
w
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Expected wage of a future entrant:
w
FE
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A.1.6 Results for Indivdualistic Bargaining
Table 9 shows the results under individualistic bargaining. The model also generates large
volatilities under individualistic bargaining (i.e., our main results do not depend on the
chosen bargaining regime. Admittely, the separation rate is somewhat too volatile. However,
if we use completely exogenous separations46, the magnitudes are fairly close to the empirical
data. The choice of the appropriate bargaining regime and the issue of completely endogenous
versus partly or completely exogenous separations is certainly an interesting topic for future
research.
46In order to keep the parametrizations comparable, we keep all other model components as exogenous
constants (e.g., the linear ￿ring costs).
34U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Volatilities for Individualistic Bargaining
Standard deviation 0.56 0.11 0.30 0.02
Relative to productivity 26.7 5.3 14.4 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.88
Volatilities for Individualistic Bargaining (Exogenous Separations)
Standard deviation 0.10 0.11 - 0.02
Relative to productivity 4.8 5.2 - 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.91 0.88 - 0.88
Table 9: Labor market volatilities for individualistic bargaining.
A.2 Robustness
The following table provides a robustness analysis (same bargaining assumption as in Tables
5 and 7) of the labor market volatilities implied by our model for values of the ￿ring cost
f = 0:08 and f = 0:20.
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Volatilities for f= 0:08
Standard deviation 0.24 0.20 0.03 0.02
Relative to productivity 11.8 10.1 1.6 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.88
Volatilities for f= 0:2
Standard deviation 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.02
Relative to productivity 4.4 7.1 1.9 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.88
Table 10: Robustness analysis for the labor market volatilities Implied for ￿ring cost
values of f = 0:08 and f = 0:20:
35